A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service

DOI10.1287/MNSC.46.4.586.12054zbMATH Open1231.91119OpenAlexW2118582661MaRDI QIDQ3116752FDOQ3116752

Authors: Frank Kelly, Richard Steinberg 

Publication date: 12 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5fe54faddcdceba1df14bbcf0492c7ba3782d86b

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zbMATH Keywords

auctionscombinatorial bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (9)

• Combinatorial auctions
• Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
• A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Location-based techniques for the synergy approximation in combinatorial transportation auctions
• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations
• Emerging multiple issue e-auctions

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