Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.07.008zbMATH Open1250.91050OpenAlexW3124709543MaRDI QIDQ2276557FDOQ2276557
Authors: Kirill Chernomaz, Dan Levin
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.008
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experimental economicsfirst-price auctionsasymmetric auctionscombinatorial auctionsfree-ridingpackage biddingindependent private value
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Core-selecting package auctions
- The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction’s Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- The package assignment model.
- A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
- Combinatorial auction design
- Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
- Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
- A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
Cited In (11)
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
- Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
- On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
- Games played through agents in the laboratory -- a test of Prat \& Rustichini's model
- A change in the timing of auctions with synergies and its impact on bidding behavior
- Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
- A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
- Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation
- An asymmetric multi-item auction with quantity discounts applied to Internet service procurement in Buenos Aires public schools
- Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
- Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
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