Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
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Publication:4531007
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00197zbMath1019.91020OpenAlexW2101012698MaRDI QIDQ4531007
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00197
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