Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00197zbMATH Open1019.91020OpenAlexW2101012698MaRDI QIDQ4531007FDOQ4531007

John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00197

zbMATH Keywords

experimentuniform price auctiondemand reductiondynamic Vickrey auctionmulti-unit demand auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (26)

• Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism
• A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
• Information frictions and market power: a laboratory study
• Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence
• Note on the applicability of the VCG mechanism to capacitated assignment problems and extensions
• Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
• Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
• Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
• What format for multi-unit multiple-bid auctions?
• Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
• Matching in the large: an experimental study
• Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Uniform price auctions and fixed price offerings in IPOs: An experimental comparison
• Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Competition in schedules with cursed traders
• Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation
• Survival auctions
• Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
• Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
• AUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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