Information frictions and market power: a laboratory study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.014zbMath1447.91070MaRDI QIDQ2195712

Jordi Brandts, Anna Bayona, Xavier Vives

Publication date: 27 August 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/219630

zbMATH Keywords

private information; wholesale electricity market; supply function competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

91-05: Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

Cites Work

• No trade
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• Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
• A Rational Theory of Mutual Funds' Attention Allocation
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Cursed Equilibrium