Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games
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Publication:4610672
DOI10.1093/restud/rdu001zbMath1405.91057OpenAlexW1966528419MaRDI QIDQ4610672
Isabelle Brocas, Colin F. Camerer, Juan D. Carrillo, Stephanie W. Wang
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/46cd4a242c52db0ecfe1b87bff2be7e4964fbd18
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