Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
DOI10.1142/S0219198919500026zbMATH Open1429.91084OpenAlexW2920820801WikidataQ127918490 ScholiaQ127918490MaRDI QIDQ5207516FDOQ5207516
Authors: M. I. Geras'kin
Publication date: 2 January 2020
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919500026
Recommendations
- Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks
- Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
- Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents
- Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
- Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
- Mathematical optimization and economic theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games
- Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
- A stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg model: analysis, computation, and application
- Nonlinear dynamics and global analysis of a heterogeneous Cournot duopoly with a local monopolistic approach versus a gradient rule with endogenous reactivity
- Oligopoly games with nonlinear demand and cost functions: Two boundedly rational adjustment processes
- A survey of game-theoretic models of cooperative advertising
- Reflexion and control: mathematical models
- A dynamic Stackelberg duopoly model with different strategies
- Two different routes to complex dynamics in an heterogeneous triopoly game
- A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
- The reflexive partitions method in models of collective behavior and control
- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
- Nonlinear oligopolistic game with isoelastic demand function: rationality and local monopolistic approximation
- Reflexive games: transformation of awareness structure
- Double best response dynamics in topology formation game for ad hoc networks
- On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game
- Oligopoly games under asymmetric costs and an application to energy production
- Aggregate production planning for process industries under oligopolistic competition
- Structural modeling of oligopoly market under the nonlinear functions of demand and agents' costs
- Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model
- Endogenous Depth of Reasoning
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (8)
- The properties of conjectural variations in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
- Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core
- Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core
- Dynamical study of competition Cournot-like duopoly games incorporating fractional order derivatives and seasonal influences
- Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
- Stability of information equilibrium in reflexive games
This page was built for publication: Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5207516)