Stability of information equilibrium in reflexive games

DOI10.1007/S10513-005-0074-5MaRDI QIDQ2487561zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dmitriĭ Aleksandrovich Novikov, Alexander G. Chkhartishvili

Publication date 8 August 2005

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10513-005-0074-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• Bayes--Nash equilibrium: infinite-depth point information structures
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3825487 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information equilibrium: punctual structures of information distribution

Cited in

(6)

• Information equilibrium: punctual structures of information distribution
• Reflexive and epistemic properties of the Tullock rent-seeking game
• Study of unsteady oligopoly markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2232347 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reflexive games: transformation of awareness structure
• Equilibrium in secure strategies as a development of the concept of Nash equilibrium

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