Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents

DOI10.1134/S0005117922030079zbMATH Open1489.91144OpenAlexW4224131325MaRDI QIDQ2139498FDOQ2139498

Authors: M. I. Geras'kin 

Publication date: 17 May 2022

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117922030079

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumoligopolyreflexive gameStackelberg leadertelecommunications market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• A course in combinatorics.
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• Reflexion and control: mathematical models
• Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity
• Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information
• Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
• Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents
• Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty
• Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader
• Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty

Cited In (6)

• The interaction of economic agents in Cournot duopoly models under ecological conditions: a comparison of organizational modes
• A survey of the latest advances in oligopoly games
• Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
• Stability of information equilibrium in reflexive games
• Convergence conditions for the dynamics of reflexive collective behavior in a Cournot oligopoly model under incomplete information
• Aggregate estimates of reflexive collective behavior dynamics in a Cournot oligopoly model

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