Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents

DOI10.1134/S0005117922030079MaRDI QIDQ2139498zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. I. Geras'kin

Publication date 17 May 2022

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117922030079

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumoligopolyreflexive gameStackelberg leadertelecommunications market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6513708 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
• A course in combinatorics.
• Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information
• Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
• Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
• Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty
• Non-cooperative games
• Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity
• Reflexion and control: mathematical models
• Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader
• Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty

Cited in

(9)

• Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks
• Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
• Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
• The interaction of economic agents in Cournot duopoly models under ecological conditions: a comparison of organizational modes
• A survey of the latest advances in oligopoly games
• Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
• Stability of information equilibrium in reflexive games
• Convergence conditions for the dynamics of reflexive collective behavior in a Cournot oligopoly model under incomplete information
• Aggregate estimates of reflexive collective behavior dynamics in a Cournot oligopoly model

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