Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
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Publication:2689633
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Cites work
- Analysis of equilibria in a nonlinear oligopoly model
- Approximate calculation of equilibria in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model: a linearization based approach
- Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information
- Effect of disruption risk on a supply chain with price-dependent demand
- Investment choice with managerial incentive schemes
- Market structure and equilibrium. Translated from the German by Damian Bazin, Lynn Urch and Rowland Hill
- Non-cooperative games
- Production and Cost Functions: An Econometric Survey
- Reflexion and control: mathematical models
- Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader
- Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty
- Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme
- The properties of conjectural variations in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
Cited in
(8)- Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
- Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents
- Problems of calculation equilibria in Stackelberg nonlinear duopoly
- Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
- Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks
- The properties of conjectural variations in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
- Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader
- Approximate calculation of equilibria in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model: a linearization based approach
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