Reflexive and epistemic properties of the Tullock rent-seeking game

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-51941-4_3MaRDI QIDQ5048463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. N. Fedyanin

Publication date 16 November 2022

Published in Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51941-4_3

zbMATH Keywords

controlepistemic modelsinformational structureopinionparametrized equilibriumrent-seekingsocial interactionTullock

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• An example of reflexive analysis of a game in normal form
• Games in dynamic-epistemic logic
• Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
• Reaching a Consensus
• Reflexion and control: mathematical models
• Social choice and individual values

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