Oligopoly games under asymmetric costs and an application to energy production

DOI10.1007/s11579-012-0076-3zbMath1260.91107OpenAlexW1988237511MaRDI QIDQ1938989

Ronnie Sircar, Andrew Ledvina

Publication date: 26 February 2013

Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.338.3441

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesBertrand modelexhaustible resourcesCournot modeloligopoliesdifferentiated goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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