How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
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Publication:1691357
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004zbMath1393.91029OpenAlexW2768135458MaRDI QIDQ1691357
Erik Wengström, Tore Ellingsen, Robert Östling
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004
Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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