Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games
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Publication:1007779
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.03.003zbMATH Open1156.91331OpenAlexW2117928113MaRDI QIDQ1007779FDOQ1007779
Authors: Pedro Rey-Biel 
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.003
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Cites Work
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A model of noisy introspection.
- Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
- Introduction to experimental game theory
Cited In (17)
- Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence
- Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking
- How to play \((3\times 3)\)-games.: A strategy method experiment.
- Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences
- Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
- Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison
- Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
- Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play
- Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
- Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
- Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
- How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
- Experience in public goods experiments
- Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab
- Structural rationality in dynamic games
- Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
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