Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
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Publication:1682705
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.009zbMath1414.91099arXiv1306.0918OpenAlexW2130074778WikidataQ60521603 ScholiaQ60521603MaRDI QIDQ1682705
Kevin Leyton-Brown, James R. Wright
Publication date: 5 December 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0918
Related Items (6)
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Uses Software
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