Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00028-2MaRDI QIDQ1292329zbMATHFDO

Authors Paul W. Wilson, Ernan E. Haruvy, Dale O. Stahl

Publication date 21 June 1999

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

statistical testsboundedly rational agentssymmetric normal-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
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Cites work

• Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

Cited in

(7)

• Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
• Games under ambiguous payoffs and optimistic attitudes
• Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
• A comparison of naive and sophisticated subject behavior with game theoretic predictions
• Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game

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