Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games
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Publication:1292329
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Cites work
Cited in
(7)- Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
- Games under ambiguous payoffs and optimistic attitudes
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- Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
- Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
- A comparison of naive and sophisticated subject behavior with game theoretic predictions
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
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