Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00028-2zbMATH Open0918.90141MaRDI QIDQ1292329FDOQ1292329

Authors: Paul W. Wilson, Ernan E. Haruvy, Dale O. Stahl 

Publication date: 21 June 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
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• Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games
• Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information

zbMATH Keywords

statistical testsboundedly rational agentssymmetric normal-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games

Cited In (6)

• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
• Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
• Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
• Games under ambiguous payoffs and optimistic attitudes
• A comparison of naive and sophisticated subject behavior with game theoretic predictions

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