Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
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Publication:2100661
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.012zbMath1505.91101arXiv2103.08319OpenAlexW4308559670MaRDI QIDQ2100661
Pierfrancesco Guarino, Gabriel Ziegler
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.08319
interactive epistemologyignoranceoptimism/pessimismwishful thinkingBörgers dominancepoint/Wald rationalizability
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