Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Second‐Order Optimism

DOI10.3982/ECTA14534zbMath1448.91123OpenAlexW2990100266WikidataQ126654840 ScholiaQ126654840MaRDI QIDQ4971281

Amanda Friedenberg

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14534

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingnegotiationsepistemic game theoryoptimismforward inductionstrategic uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (6)

An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Limited foresight equilibrium ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

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