Limited foresight equilibrium
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Publication:2078063
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.001zbMATH Open1483.91020OpenAlexW4205933424MaRDI QIDQ2078063FDOQ2078063
Authors: Jeevant Rampal 
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.001
Recommendations
Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- A course in game theory.
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Limited foresight may force cooperation
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
- Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
- A backward induction experiment
- Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction
- Endogenous depth of reasoning
- Three steps ahead
- One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
- Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
- Reasoning about others' reasoning
- Boundedly rational backward induction
Cited In (9)
- Limited lookahead in imperfect-information games
- Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Limited-trust equilibria
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Limited foresight may force cooperation
- Myopic and perfect foresight in the OLG model
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
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