Limited foresight equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.001MaRDI QIDQ2078063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeevant Rampal

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriumsequential bargainingcentipede gameforesight

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Recommendations

• Limited foresight may force cooperation
• Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Three steps ahead
• Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight

Cites work

• A backward induction experiment
• A course in game theory.
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
• Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
• Boundedly rational backward induction
• Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction
• Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
• Endogenous depth of reasoning
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
• Limited foresight may force cooperation
• Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Reasoning about others' reasoning
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Three steps ahead

Cited in

(9)

• Limited lookahead in imperfect-information games
• Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Limited-trust equilibria
• Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
• Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
• Limited foresight may force cooperation
• Myopic and perfect foresight in the OLG model
• Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games

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