Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6604759
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18237 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- A course in game theory.
- A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
- Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
- Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Endogenous depth of reasoning
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
- Informational herding with model misspecification
- Learning with heterogeneous misspecified models: characterization and robustness
- Level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Limited foresight equilibrium
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Reasoning about others' reasoning
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
- The chain store paradox
This page was built for publication: Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6604759)
