Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
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Publication:6604759
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105871zbMATH Open1544.91048MaRDI QIDQ6604759FDOQ6604759
Authors: Po-Hsuan Lin, Thomas R. Palfrey 
Publication date: 13 September 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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