Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
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Publication:960260
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.03.001zbMATH Open1153.91376OpenAlexW2105285181MaRDI QIDQ960260FDOQ960260
Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv, Syngjoo Choi
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.001
Recommendations
experimentquantal response equilibriummonotone gamespure strategymixed strategyrefinementsMarkov perfect
Cites Work
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Joint Projects without Commitment
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Dynamic coordination games
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
Cited In (10)
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions
- Dynamic contributions to a public project: the impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits
- Network architecture, salience and coordination
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
- Incremental approaches to establishing trust
- Bygones in a public project
- What makes an opinion leader: expertise vs popularity
- Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
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