IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

DOI10.1111/iere.12606zbMath1530.91073MaRDI QIDQ6067140

Andrew Choi, Yves Guéron, Unnamed Author, Syngjoo Choi

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=view&seqidx=54

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

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