IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
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Publication:6067140
DOI10.1111/iere.12606zbMath1530.91073MaRDI QIDQ6067140
Andrew Choi, Yves Guéron, Unnamed Author, Syngjoo Choi
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=view&seqidx=54
Public goods (91B18) Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)
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