Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
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Publication:4503718
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00134zbMath0972.91028OpenAlexW2104324367MaRDI QIDQ4503718
Steven A. Matthews, Leslie M. Marx
Publication date: 12 November 2001
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00134
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