Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.011zbMath1452.91041OpenAlexW3043967478MaRDI QIDQ2206810

Tomoya Tajika

Publication date: 26 October 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycontribute oncedynamic contribution game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

Voting on tricky questions ⋮ Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Cites Work

• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
• Projects and Team Dynamics
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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