Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
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Publication:2173095
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105017zbMath1437.91063OpenAlexW1760610438MaRDI QIDQ2173095
Parkash Chander, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15897
coalition-proof Nash equilibriumsubgame perfectioncoalitional gameextensive gamebargaining gamecentipede game
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