On the core of dynamic cooperative games
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Publication:384054
DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0078-7zbMath1281.91015arXiv1203.2832OpenAlexW3105079160MaRDI QIDQ384054
Publication date: 25 November 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.2832
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Cites Work
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