Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.02.005zbMATH Open1368.91026OpenAlexW2288402691MaRDI QIDQ268639FDOQ268639

Authors: Guilherme Carmona, Luis Carvalho 

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/810994/7/SRI_deposit_agreement.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamestwo-person zero-sum games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
• Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
• On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
• On the size and structure of group cooperation

Cited In (2)

• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments

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