Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:815214
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012zbMath1122.91013MaRDI QIDQ815214
Publication date: 16 February 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012
common interest; subgame perfect equilibrium; repeated game; perfect information; anti-folk theorem; asynchronous move; pure coordination
Related Items
Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring, Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination, Coordination need not be a problem, Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Are ``Anti-Folk Theorems in repeated games nongeneric?
- Dynamic coordination games
- Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive-form games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Collusion, discounting and dynamic games
- Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
- Coordination need not be a problem
- Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
- Joint Projects without Commitment
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
