Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.012MaRDI QIDQ815214zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Satoru Takahashi

Publication date 16 February 2006

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012

zbMATH Keywords

perfect informationrepeated gamesubgame perfect equilibriumanti-folk theoremasynchronous movecommon interestpure coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Coordination need not be a problem
• Cooperation and Effective Computability
• Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1396804 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
• A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Are ``Anti-Folk Theorems in repeated games nongeneric?
• Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
• Collusion, discounting and dynamic games
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Coordination need not be a problem
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Dynamic coordination games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Game theory
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive-form games
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(5)

• Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
• Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• Coordination need not be a problem

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