Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1396804 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
- A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Are ``Anti-Folk Theorems in repeated games nongeneric?
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Collusion, discounting and dynamic games
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Coordination need not be a problem
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Dynamic coordination games
- Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
- Game theory
- Joint Projects without Commitment
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive-form games
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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