Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.005zbMath1422.91112OpenAlexW2947505390WikidataQ127706839 ScholiaQ127706839MaRDI QIDQ2324796

Paolo Siconolfi, Prajit K. Dutta

Publication date: 12 September 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

transfersasynchronousfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Synchronization in security games

Uses Software

• repgames

Cites Work

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