Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
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Publication:1194264
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90048-WzbMATH Open0764.90104OpenAlexW2016792078MaRDI QIDQ1194264FDOQ1194264
Authors: Lones Smith
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90048-w
Recommendations
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
- Overlapping Generation Games with Mixed Strategies
- Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
- The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
Cites Work
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
- A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
Cited In (18)
- A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
- Inefficiency in alternately repeated games with overlapping generations
- Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
- Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
- Evolution game model of travel mode choice in metropolitan
- A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
- Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
- Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
- Decentralized matching and social segregation
- Cooperation in an overlapping generations experiment.
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- Overlapping Generation Games with Mixed Strategies
- Labor union members play an OLG repeated game
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation
- Cooperation in stochastic OLG games
- Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
- Overlapping generations games with growing payoffs
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