A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
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Publication:957854
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0293-9zbMath1151.91025OpenAlexW2097407159MaRDI QIDQ957854
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, Roger D. Lagunoff
Publication date: 1 December 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723685
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Cites Work
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