Refining cheap-talk equilibria
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Publication:1181665
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90040-BzbMath0743.90118OpenAlexW1970319808MaRDI QIDQ1181665
Andrew Postlewaite, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Steven A. Matthews
Publication date: 27 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90040-b
Related Items (25)
Good manners: signaling social preferences ⋮ Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights ⋮ RANDOM AUTHORITY ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games ⋮ A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games ⋮ Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets ⋮ Credible deviations from signaling equilibria ⋮ Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Evolutions of communication with partial common interest ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Persuasion with communication costs ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information ⋮ Language and coordination games ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Cites Work
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Communication between rational agents
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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