Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium

DOI10.2307/1912659zbMATH Open0587.90103OpenAlexW2078533237MaRDI QIDQ3714931FDOQ3714931

Authors: Andrew McLennan 

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912659

Recommendations

• Sequential Equilibria
• Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
• Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs
• On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesequential equilibriumjustifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cited In (19)

• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Strong forward induction
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Another impossibility result for normal form games
• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Forward induction equilibrium
• Strategic irrationality in extensive games
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
• On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
• Sequential Equilibria
• Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
• Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
• Computation of equilibria in noncooperative games

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