Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
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Publication:3714931
DOI10.2307/1912659zbMATH Open0587.90103OpenAlexW2078533237MaRDI QIDQ3714931FDOQ3714931
Authors: Andrew McLennan
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912659
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- Forward induction equilibrium
- Strategic irrationality in extensive games
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
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- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Sequential Equilibria
- Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
- Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
- Computation of equilibria in noncooperative games
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