Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
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Publication:1090264
DOI10.1007/BF01769254zbMath0619.90095MaRDI QIDQ1090264
Publication date: 1986
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (16)
A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection ⋮ The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements ⋮ ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION ⋮ Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games ⋮ Dual reduction and elementary games ⋮ Log-linear dynamics and local potential ⋮ Coherent behavior in noncooperative games ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights ⋮ An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty ⋮ Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ Two examples of strategic equilibrium ⋮ A note on correlated equilibrium ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience
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