Two examples of strategic equilibrium

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80007-7zbMATH Open0833.90130OpenAlexW2023517618MaRDI QIDQ1804643FDOQ1804643

Jean-François Mertens

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80007-7

Recommendations

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• On strictly proper equilibria
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Sequential Equilibria

zbMATH Keywords

strategic equilibriumquasi-perfect equilibriaunique subgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games

Cited In (8)

• The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
• The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements
• Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium
• Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game
• On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
• A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
• On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
• The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games

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