A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
The concept of quasi-perfect equilibria is introduced for games in extensive form. This concept is slightly weaker than Selten's perfectness concept, but slightly more restrictive than Kreps' and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibria. The main result of the paper is that every proper equilibrium of a normal form game induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive game with this normal form. Hence, whether an equilibrium is sequential, can already be detected in the normal form. One section of the paper contains examples illustrating this result as well as the discrepancy between perfectness in the normal form and perfectness in the extensive form.
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