A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
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Publication:792231
DOI10.1007/BF01769861zbMATH Open0536.90098OpenAlexW1522839481MaRDI QIDQ792231FDOQ792231
Authors: Eric van Damme 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769861
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Cites Work
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