Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-86593-1_18OpenAlexW3203844542MaRDI QIDQ2140505FDOQ2140505

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund

Publication date: 20 May 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04300

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
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• Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Sequential Equilibria
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• Smallest compact formulation for the permutahedron
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game
• An Inequality
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
• Two examples of strategic equilibrium
• The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
• The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form
• The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements
• The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games

Cited In (1)

• On the polynomial time computation of equilibria for certain exchange economies

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