Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-86593-1_18OpenAlexW3203844542MaRDI QIDQ2140505

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund

Publication date: 20 May 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04300

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

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