Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0602MaRDI QIDQ1268635zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georg Kirchsteiger, Klaus Ritzberger, Werner Güth

Publication date 18 October 1998

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0602

zbMATH Keywords

noisesubgame perfect equilibriumimperfect observabilitysubgame perfectiontwo-stage gamecommitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Commitment and observability in games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Sequential Equilibria
• The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint

Cited in

(12)

• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
• Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE

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