Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
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Publication:1268635
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0602zbMATH Open0911.90359OpenAlexW2118259328MaRDI QIDQ1268635FDOQ1268635
Authors: Georg Kirchsteiger, Klaus Ritzberger, Werner Güth 
Publication date: 18 October 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0602
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Commitment and observability in games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
Cited In (12)
- Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
- A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games
- An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
- Moral hazard and private monitoring
- Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
- Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
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