Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500086MaRDI QIDQ5269940zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brishti Guha

Publication date 28 June 2017

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500086

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsequential gamescostly leader gamestype heterogeneityleader advantage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Recommendations

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Leadership games with convex strategy sets
• Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

Cites work

• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Commitment and observability in games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly

Cited in

(3)

• On Yano's Price Leadership Game
• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach

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