Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500086zbMATH Open1391.91065OpenAlexW2592672702MaRDI QIDQ5269940FDOQ5269940

Authors: Brishti Guha 

Publication date: 28 June 2017

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500086

Recommendations

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Leadership games with convex strategy sets
• Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsequential gamescostly leader gamestype heterogeneityleader advantage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• Commitment and observability in games
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

Cited In (3)

• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
• On Yano's Price Leadership Game

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