The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
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Cites work
- Commitment and observability in games
- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
Cited in
(15)- Commitment and observability in games
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
- Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
- Value of information for a leader-follower partially observed Markov game
- Effects of strategic choices for the postmerger manufacturer on supply chain members
- Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
- On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games
- Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
- Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
- Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion
- Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games
- An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
- Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
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