Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0165-9MaRDI QIDQ633772zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yutian Chen

Publication date 30 March 2011

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0165-9

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionStackelberg competitionsourcingentry deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Commitment and observability in games
• Explaining cross-supplies
• The make-or-buy decision in the presence of a rival: strategic outsourcing to a common supplier
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

Cited in

(5)

• A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale
• Strategic outsourcing decisions of new entrant and competing incumbent manufacturer in a supply chain with common supplier
• Strategic obfuscation of production capacities
• Contracts in a procurement supply chain with intermediation: Combating collusion in price competition
• To make or to buy from a common supplier? Strategic considerations and welfare consequences

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