Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion
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Cites work
Cited in
(5)- A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale
- Strategic outsourcing decisions of new entrant and competing incumbent manufacturer in a supply chain with common supplier
- Strategic obfuscation of production capacities
- Contracts in a procurement supply chain with intermediation: Combating collusion in price competition
- To make or to buy from a common supplier? Strategic considerations and welfare consequences
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