A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0148MaRDI QIDQ6131140

Ted Lindblom, Stefan Sjögren, Aineas Mallios

Publication date: 4 April 2024

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

competitiontechnology licensingcollusiondiseconomies of scale

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Licensing under convex costs
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion
• Royalty licensing
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Revenue royalties
• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• The Bargaining Problem
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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