A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0148MaRDI QIDQ6131140FDOQ6131140

Authors: Ted Lindblom, Aineas Mallios, Stefan Sjögren 

Publication date: 4 April 2024

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

competitioncollusiontechnology licensingdiseconomies of scale

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Licensing under convex costs
• Royalty licensing
• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion
• Revenue royalties

Cited In (1)

• Technology licensing and collusion

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