Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
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Publication:2098878
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0097zbMath1506.91075OpenAlexW2528718192MaRDI QIDQ2098878
Sukanta Bhattacharya, Neelanjan Sen
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0097
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (3)
A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale ⋮ Information disclosure through technology licensing ⋮ Dilemma of quality information disclosure in technology licensing
Cites Work
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- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information
- Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
- Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
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