On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
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Publication:1851234
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2863zbMath1022.91036DBLPjournals/jet/Schmitz02OpenAlexW3122560212WikidataQ29544424 ScholiaQ29544424MaRDI QIDQ1851234
Publication date: 16 December 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2708664d1547516044d6120ef3bd0752b89ddce8
Related Items (6)
General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation ⋮ Information disclosure through technology licensing ⋮ Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information ⋮ On the licensing of a technology with unknown use ⋮ Technology licensing under optimal tax policy ⋮ Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
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