Technology licensing under optimal tax policy
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Publication:741573
DOI10.1007/s00712-012-0277-5zbMath1294.91068OpenAlexW1971030234MaRDI QIDQ741573
Publication date: 12 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0277-5
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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- Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
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- On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- Technology transfer with commitment.
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