Technology licensing under optimal tax policy
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1292563 (Why is no real title available?)
- Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
- Optimal license fees for a new product
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
- Technology transfer with commitment.
- Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist
- Welfare reducing licensing.
Cited in
(12)- Licensing under convex costs
- Cooperation strategy of technology licensing based on evolutionary game
- Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
- The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
- An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures
- Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
- Privatization in the presence of patent licensing
- Profit-sharing licensing
- Technology licensing strategy for network product in a service industry
- Intellectual property and taxation of digital platforms
- Environmental policy, licensing strategy, and social welfare
- DECISION MAKING ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: FIXED-FEE VERSUS ROYALTY LICENSING METHODS
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