Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
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Publication:1046241
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.011zbMath1179.91093MaRDI QIDQ1046241
Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Debapriya Sen
Publication date: 21 December 2009
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.011
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
Related Items
Licensing under convex costs, Technology licensing under optimal tax policy, Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: general results, Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
Cites Work
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- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered