The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0047-5zbMATH Open1172.91306OpenAlexW2068434672MaRDI QIDQ852337FDOQ852337

Authors: Yair Tauman, Naoki Watanabe 

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0047-5

Recommendations

• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
• The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
• Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
• Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: general results
• On the asymmetric Shapley value for cooperative games
• The asymptotic Shapley value for a simple market game
• Patent-investment games under asymmetric information

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuepatent licensingmax-min and min-max

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered
• Coalition production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs. Asymptotic results

Cited In (23)

• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree
• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
• Bargaining with a property rights owner
• FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
• Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups
• Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
• Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
• Symmetrical core and Shapley value of an information transferal game
• Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
• A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs
• Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result
• Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
• Optimal formation rules for patent pools
• On the core of a patent licensing game
• Foreign investigations in the field of game-theoretic analysis of innovations
• The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
• Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems

This page was built for publication: The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q852337)