The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0047-5zbMath1172.91306MaRDI QIDQ852337

Yair Tauman, Naoki Watanabe

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0047-5

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; patent licensing; max-min and min-max

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

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