The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0047-5zbMath1172.91306OpenAlexW2068434672MaRDI QIDQ852337

Yair Tauman, Naoki Watanabe

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0047-5

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuepatent licensingmax-min and min-max

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications ⋮ Optimal formation rules for patent pools ⋮ On the core of a patent licensing game ⋮ Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market ⋮ Symmetrical Core and Shapley Value of an Information Transferal Game ⋮ Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments ⋮ A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ Foreign investigations in the field of game-theoretic analysis of innovations ⋮ FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION ⋮ The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees ⋮ Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games ⋮ Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups ⋮ Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems ⋮ The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree ⋮ Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach ⋮ Bargaining with a property rights owner ⋮ Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes ⋮ Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result ⋮ The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach ⋮ Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies

Cites Work

• Coalition production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs. Asymptotic results
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered
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