On licensing policies in Bertrand competition

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Publication:2367158

DOI10.1006/game.1993.1015zbMath0780.90025OpenAlexW1490926026MaRDI QIDQ2367158

Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 23 January 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8250a946b9b4884388169aa33df4a99c21b93a55




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