On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
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Publication:2367158
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1015zbMath0780.90025OpenAlexW1490926026MaRDI QIDQ2367158
Publication date: 23 January 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8250a946b9b4884388169aa33df4a99c21b93a55
auctionroyaltydifferentiated goodsBertrand-type duopolyfeelicensing policiesmultistage noncooperative game
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