Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
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Publication:459379
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.05.002zbMATH Open1296.91017OpenAlexW2081117617MaRDI QIDQ459379FDOQ459379
Authors: Shin Kishimoto
Publication date: 8 October 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.002
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Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
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- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
- Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
- FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
- Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
- Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
- The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
- Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
Cited In (14)
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
- Cooperation strategy of technology licensing based on evolutionary game
- The bargaining model of technology licensing
- Bargaining with a property rights owner
- FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
- Licensing agreements as bargaining outcomes: general results and two examples
- Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
- Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
- Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents
- Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
- The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
- Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
- On the core of a patent licensing game
- The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
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