Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.002zbMath1296.91017OpenAlexW2081117617MaRDI QIDQ459379

Shin Kishimoto

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ On the core of a patent licensing game ⋮ Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach

Cites Work

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• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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