Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
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Publication:4583986
DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12020.XzbMATH Open1416.91138OpenAlexW2134498594MaRDI QIDQ4583986FDOQ4583986
Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, Cecilia Vergari
Publication date: 29 August 2018
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12020.x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cited In (4)
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