Privatization in the presence of patent licensing
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Publication:1650872
DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0435-7zbMATH Open1402.91239OpenAlexW2043344274MaRDI QIDQ1650872FDOQ1650872
Authors: Shuai Niu 
Publication date: 16 July 2018
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0435-7
Recommendations
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
- Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets
- Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
- Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures
- Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
Cited In (5)
- Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
- Licensing pricing discrimination and allocative efficiency about the Chinese dual-use defense technology under a military shareholding contract
- Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty
- Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
- Upstream privatization and downstream licensing
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