Privatization in the presence of patent licensing
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Cites work
- Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures
- Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
- Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate
- Welfare reducing licensing.
Cited in
(5)- Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
- Licensing pricing discrimination and allocative efficiency about the Chinese dual-use defense technology under a military shareholding contract
- Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty
- Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
- Upstream privatization and downstream licensing
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