Privatization in the presence of patent licensing

DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0435-7zbMath1402.91239OpenAlexW2043344274MaRDI QIDQ1650872

Shuai Niu

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0435-7

zbMATH Keywords

technologywelfarelicensingprivatization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (1)

Upstream privatization and downstream licensing

Cites Work

• Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
• Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate
• Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures
• Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered

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